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This study investigates the channels through which macroeconomic and institutional instability 
hinders innovative investment undertakings financed by the domestic private sector. The analysis is 
based on a sample of 44 countries and considers various instability dimensions. The results suggest 
a negative impact of real, monetary, and political instability on the aggregate level of R&D financed 
by the business sector. Thus, highlighting the importance of stable macro-institutional environments 
in preventing avoidance or abandonment of private innovation undertakings.
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1. Introduction
The importance of private sector’s innovation is widely recognised in the economic growth 
literature (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). However, pronounced disparities persist in 
2the shares of private Research and Development (R&D) investment across countries. Figure 1 
below may help gauge the extent of the cross-country disparity existing in private sectors’ R&D 
engagement, within the panel of economies used in this study. A number of structural factors have 
been investigated at length and proposed by the literature to explain such variation. This paper seeks 
to analyse such issue by focusing on the impact that macroeconomic and institutional instability. 
The reason for considering such perspective is related to the inherently high risk content of R&D 
investment, which is due to both its longer than average maturity horizon and to its high budget 
requirements (Katz, 1987). Hence, firms’ plans to spend on costly and risky innovative projects 
may be subject to revision in uncertain environments, resulting in low aggregate private innovation 
spending. In what follows, it will be shown that such hypothesis is supported by the findings of our 
empirical analysis.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
    A number of microeconomic studies attribute firms’ abandonment or avoidance of innovative 
investment undertakings to the existence of a cash-flow effect, which financially constrains them 
and hinders their innovative spending during downturns (Bohva-Padilla et al, 2009, Aghion et al, 
2010). To the contrary, following the Schumpeterian analysis of the business cycle and Hall’s 
reorganizational capital theory (1991), Saint-Paul (1993) maintains that, during recessions, the 
opportunity cost faced by innovating firms in terms of foregone profits is lower, as the value of 
expected sales decreases. This should provide an incentive for firms to allocate resources to R&D 
during recessionary phases. However, Rafferty and Funk (2008) and Aghion et al. (2012) show that 
the existence of an asymmetry in binding constraints causes cash-flow effects to bind more during 
recessions than expansions. The result is that during recessions firms disinvest more than what they 
invest during expansions. Instead, the ‘opportunity-cost’ effect is shown to bind more during 
expansions. As a result, firms tend to relocate resources away from R&D, and towards sales, when 
positive demand shocks occur, but the opposite is less likely to happen during negative shocks.  In 
3addition, Bohva-Padilla et al. (2009) show that counter-cyclicality in R&D spending is more likely 
in small and medium-sized firms, which tend to experience binding credit constraints the most; 
whereas, pro-cyclicality is more likely for non-credit constrained firms, such as multinationals.
    This paper represents a contribution to the existing literature on volatility and innovation in a few 
respects. Firstly, the literature described above concentrates on recessions, while this study extends 
the focus to overall volatility in relation to firms’ innovative behavior. Secondly, the research 
question has only been tackled at the firm level, and most often focusing on OECD-based firms 
only. The present study analyses, instead, cross-country variations in the level of national private 
R&D. This is done in an attempt to uncover aggregate response patterns to macro-institutional 
instability which go beyond individual productive sectors’ dynamics. A final contribution is 
represented by the estimation of separate impacts for various sub-components of aggregate 
volatility. This allows to disentangle a number of contemporaneous yet different dimensions co-
existing in unstable macro-institutional environments. The econometric findings suggest, in 
addition, that such impacts exhibit non-linearities and threshold effects. 
2. Data and Model
The panel covers 15 years (1994-2008) and 44 countries. Unfortunately, the limitation of aggregate 
innovation data is its scarcity. In particular, the panel suffers from an underrepresentation of African 
countries that needs to be acknowledged. The choice of regressors included in the model 
specification has taken into account and sought comparison with a variety of stability indicators 
used in the literature, and it includes a number of control variables which have been used by the 
literature on the determinants of innovative investment. The benchmark econometric specification is 
as follows: 
4(1)                                          yit = ai +
m
∑
j = 1
βjXj,it +
n
∑
k = 1
γkZk,it +
q
∑
l = 1
θlVl,it + εit
where the dependent variable, yit, is BusinessR&D: the share of investment in R&D financed by the 
domestic business sector, calculated as a % of GDP. The right hand side of the regression includes 
three variable vectors, alongside a vector of time-invariant country fixed effects, αi.1 The set 
 and  contain, respectively, endogenous and exogenous control variables {Xj,it} mj = 1 {Zk,it} nk = 1
commonly used in the literature surrounding the determinants of R&D investment. 
    Specifically, the following variables enter : GDP per capita (in log-form) controls for  {Xj,it} mj = 1
countries’ overall level of development.2 To capture potential non-linearities in the relationship 
between development level and private R&D spending, an interaction of GDP per capita with a 
dummy variable (HighIncome) was also included. The dummy takes the value of 1 for countries 
classified as middle to high income by the World Bank’s Atlas classification system and zero 
otherwise.  The share of publicly financed R&D is used to capture the role of public investment, 
which may be complementary to private innovative investment or may crowd it out (David et al., 
2000). Finally, this vector also contains a measure of trade openness calculated as the sum of 
exports and imports to GDP. Trade openness has been used by the literature (Smolny, 2003; Sameti 
et al., 2010) to capture the contribution that international exchange is likely to have on the ease and 
pace of innovation and technological progress. 
    The real interest rate appears among the exogenous control set , alongside, a {Zk,it} nk = 1
measure of stock market capitalization. The latter has been used in a number of studies to proxy for 
financial development; but it also captures the effect of higher levels of both credit availability and 
risk diversification accessible to the business sector (David et al., 2000; Levine and Zervos, 1996).  
In addition, a measure of property rights protection is also included to reflect the importance this 
5variable is believed to play in explaining the pace of innovation (Varsakelis; 2001; Lin et al., 2010). 
Finally, as a component of government expenditure appears in the model (public R&D) a measure 
of overall government deficit/surplus to GDP is also included. This is done in order to achieve a 
consistent specification of the public budget constraint (Bose et al., 2007; Katsimi and Sarantides, 
2012). At the same time, this variable proxies for the quality of public account management. While, 
strictly speaking, the latter is not a standard indicator of instability, it nonetheless provides a 
measure of fiscal reliability, and it has been used in the literature in this way (Fisher, 1993; 
Burnside and Dollar, 2000). 
    The third vector  is composed by instability indicators. The Polity IV ‘State Fragility {Vl,it} ql = 1
Index’ is used as an indicator of institutional stability. The index rates countries according to the 
fragility of their effectiveness and legitimacy, in four performance dimensions: security, policy, 
economics, and social cohesion. Institutional uncertainty affects many elements of the 
macroeconomic business environment, via, for example, failing policy commitments; switching tax 
and incentive regimes; or revised economic targets and priorities (Fosu, 1992; Alesina et al., 1996). 
Real, financial and monetary volatility are represented, respectively, by the coefficient of variation 
of (log) GDP per capita, stock market capitalisation, and real interest rate.3 Recurrent fluctuations in 
output proxy for the instability in the overall level of savings and aggregate demand; whereas 
variability in stock market capitalisation rates or in lending interest rates influence the cost of 
capital.
    The model is, first, estimated using a simple within-group estimator, which takes care of time-
invariant country specific fixed effects. Subsequently, to evaluate the model’s dynamics of 
adjustment and to address any potential simultaneity bias, the same estimation is applied to a 
specification where the lags of all endogenous variables are used instead of their levels. However, 
6standard within-group panel techniques may exacerbate measurement errors and does not deal with 
cross-sectional dependence concerns. Following Pesaran (2004) and Baltagi (2005), if such cross-
sectional dependence is caused by unobserved common factors uncorrelated with the included 
regressors, the standard within-group estimator will still be consistent. But, if this is not the case, a 
solution is the estimation of fixed-effect IVs, provided weak identification of the instruments is not 
an issue (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). Therefore, a within-group Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) model is estimated last, with a varying set of instruments. First, internal instruments are 
used, that is, first and second lags of all endogenous variables. Because private innovative 
investment is likely to exhibit lagged response patterns to changes in the variables appearing on the 
RHS of the regression, the use of time-lagged internal instruments allows for the evaluation of such 
‘adjustment dynamics’. This is, in general, a second-best strategy, as, ideally, one would want to 
use excluded variables that are highly correlated with the endogenous controls but do not belong in 
the model specification. Despite the difficulty of finding variables meeting such requirements in 
macroeconomic settings, we attempt to test the robustness of the benchmark model by using a set of 
external instruments, too.
3. Results
The benchmark regression in equation (1) is estimated in Table 1 in its basic, more parsimonious, 
form first. Subsequently, all volatility indicators are progressively included. Columns (1)-(7) are 
within-group estimates, while column (8)-(10) are 2SLS-FE estimates. In the most basic regression 
specification, both GDP per capita and its interaction term are significant, albeit of opposite sign. 
This suggests the existence of a threshold level of GDP per capita after which Business R&D and 
the level of a development are positively related. Such threshold value of average national GDP per 
capita occurs, in this sample, at about $3000 per year.4 The lending interest rate enters with a 
negative coefficient, as expected. The coefficient of stock market capitalisation indicates that more 
7developed financial markets positively relate to the share of privately funded R&D, possibly thanks 
to enhanced capital stock accumulation and productivity. The latter result is in line with Levine and 
Zervos (1996) and Greenwood and Smith (1997). All other covariates enter the basic within-group 
specification with coefficient insignificantly different from zero. 
[INSERT TABLE 1]
    Successively, moving from left to right in columns (2)-(5), the instability measures are added one 
at a time, separately. All enter with a negative sign, which indicates that excessive fluctuations in 
stock market capitalization rates, in aggregate output, in lending interest rates, and in the political 
environment all negatively affect private innovative investment. These findings are in line with 
those of Barro (1991), Alesina et al. (1996), Fosu (2003), Aghion et al. (2012). In column (6), all 
volatility measures are included in the benchmark at the same time. Two relevant changes take 
place: the results now indicate that improved fiscal performance is positively related to private 
innovation spending, while financial volatility is no longer significant when the other measures of 
real, monetary and political instability are included at the same time. This may indicate that, when 
financial volatility appeared on its own, its positive coefficient might have been partly capturing the 
effect of the other three components. 
     One possible drawback of the results presented thus far is that they may be biased by reverse 
causation between the dependent variable and the endogenous covariates.To address this, in column 
(7), all endogenous variables are replaced by their first lag. While all results are substantially very 
similar to the ones previously presented, something to note is the fact that the level of GDP per 
capita turns insignificant, as does State Fragility. A further concern, as anticipated above, is that 
related to the potential presence of cross-sectional dependence. To address that, as well as to 
improve upon the treatment of endogeneity, a within-group 2SLS model is estimated in columns 
(8)-(10). In column (8), only the first lag is used in the internal instrument set, and in column (9) 
8only the second lag. Both the interest rate and the index of property right protection lose 
significance in (8), while government balance gains it. All other results carry over from (7). In 
column (9), again the core results regarding the instability measures only slightly vary in 
magnitude. The interest rate is once again significant, as is government R&D expenditure albeit 
only at the 10% level.5 A concern with the results of (8) and (9) arises, however, as the Kleibergen-
Paap F statistics is considerably below 10, indicating that the identification of these models is weak. 
A Hansen-J statistics for the overidentification test is not reported for either because the equations 
are exactly identified. 
     To improve upon such shortcomings, in column (10) both sets of lags are combined in the 
instrumentation strategy. Once again, results carry over from previous specifications in that the 
impact of the level of development is overall positive, but the result is driven, in this sample, by 
middle to high income countries only. In fact, low income levels appear to be marginally 
detrimental to private innovative investment. Neither public R&D spending nor trade openness have 
an impact which is significantly different from zero, evidence similar to that reported by David et 
al. (2000) and Varsakelis (2001). Improves rule of law enforcement leads to higher aggregate 
innovation spending, a result in line with Varsakelis (2001) and Lin et al. (2010). The stock market 
capitalization rate is again insignificant when estimated along the other instability measures. 
Because this variable has never entered the regression with a non-zero impact, except when 
estimated on its own, it will dropped from all subsequent robustness tests. Real, monetary and 
political instability confirm their negative relationship with private R&D investment. The 
instruments validity for the benchmark is confirmed by the F and Hansen-J statistics of (10), 
indicating that the regression is correctly identified. 
9    In order to provide a quantitative interpretation of the coefficient magnitude for the instability 
indicators, it may be useful to refer to the summary statistics table (Table 2 below). The real 
volatility coefficient reported in column (10) of Table 1, can be interpreted in percentage change 
terms (see Appendix B for details). It indicates that, in this sample, a 0.1 % point increase in the 
coefficient of variation of (log) GDP per capita, leads to a 0.014% point decrease in private R&D 
spending. As for monetary volatility: half a standard deviation increase in the coefficient of 
variation of the interest rate results approximately in a 0.05% point decrease in R&D. Finally, a 2 
point increase in the ‘State Fragility’ Index (which ranges from 0 to 25) leads to a 0.046% point 
decrease in aggregate Business R&D spending. Considering that the minimum sample value of 
Business R&D as a share of GDP is equal to 0.0007%, and its mean is 0.71%, it can be seen that 
such impacts are non-trivial.6
[INSERT TABLE 2]
4. Robustness Analysis
In the following section, the robustness of the findings reported so far is tested by re-estimating the 
benchmark under various modifications. It will be shown that the basic findings are not affected. To 
start with, the benchmark specification is repeated in column (1) of Table 3 to facilitate comparison. 
As already mentioned, using internal instruments may not be a viable option if lags of the 
endogenous variables belong themselves to the model. To address this concern, in column (2), 
external instruments are substituted to the internal. Recall that the endogenous variables are (log) 
GDP per capita and its interaction term, government R&D expenditure, and trade openness. The 
external instruments are the infant mortality rate, adjusted life expectancy, total tax revenue 
(%GDP),7 and an aggregate regional average of the trade openness measure used in the rest of the 
analysis. 
[INSERT TABLE 3]
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    The core results are not altered, except for the fact that rule of law loses significance, while trade 
openness gains a positive and significant coefficient. A summary of the first stage regression 
statistics is presented in Table B1 of Appendix B below. All F-tests, except that for the government 
R&D regression, point towards the significance of the excluded instruments. Nevertheless, the 
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F-test indicates there may be a problem of weak identification in both 
the trade openness and government R&D reduced form regressions. As it is well known, weak 
identification decreases considerably the explanatory power of 2SLS. Therefore, because the 
Hansen-J statistics in column (1) indicates that the exclusion restrictions are valid when internal 
instruments are used, the specification where internal rather than external instruments are used 
remains our preferred specification. Next, in column (3), time dummies are added to control for any 
time effect common across countries. All results carry over with no significant variation. However, 
because no time dummy is significant, they are all dropped from any subsequent estimation.8 
   
 I turn, now, to the analysis of potential non-linearities. The impact of volatility on investment has 
been suggested to exhibit threshold effects. Sarkar (2000) argues that a positive relationship occurs 
at low uncertainty levels, which switches to negative when uncertainty rises beyond a critical 
threshold. To test this hypothesis, quadratic terms are included in column (4), and interaction terms 
in (5). The quadratic terms for both real and monetary volatility indicate that, as either volatility 
dimension increases, R&D spending decreases at a decreasing rate.9 The rest of the results carry 
over from previous specifications. In (5), we test whether the impact of instability varies according 
to the phase of the business cycle. To do this, a measure of GDP deviation from its mean was 
created10 and interacted with each volatility indicator. The interaction terms should indicate whether 
any difference exists between the impact of volatility during a recession and its impact during an 
expansion. 
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It appears that, only for the monetary volatility component, as the phase of the cycle improves, 
volatility in the interest rate becomes less of a hindrance to private R&D spending. This result is 
line with the claim, made by the body of microeconometric literature reported above, that 
uncertainty has less of a negative effect when credit constraint are not as binding (Aghion and Saint 
Paul, 1998; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009; Aghion et al., 2012). If such 
‘credit constraint’ effect is the prevailing force underlying different investment responses along the 
business cycle, then this may account for the failure to identify a similar impact in the case of real 
and political instability. Moreover, uncertainty in output and state effectiveness levels is less 
observable than fluctuations in the official lending interest rate. For this reason, the aggregate 
spending adjustment to real or political instability may be not as correlated or synchronised to the 
phase of the cycle as it is the case of interest rate variations. No other change takes place with 
regards to all other results.
    Next, in column (6) and (7), I test the robustness of the volatility impacts uncovered so far to 
variations in the way instability is measured, or variations in the channel through which the impact 
takes place. In particular, in (6), I use the standard deviation of both (log) GDP per capita and 
interest rate instead of their coefficient of variation. A great part of the literature agrees on the 
coefficient of variation being a more robust indicator of volatility than the standard deviation. 
Mobarak (2005) and Klomp and de Haan (2009) argue that the latter is an absolute measure of 
variation and it is very sensitive to noise in the data. The normalisation involved in the coefficient 
of variation, instead, makes it a relative measure of variation. In this respect, Klomp and de Haan 
(2009) show that the coefficient of variation allows to appropriately control for co-movements of 
similar countries, due, for example, to the effect of common business cycle patterns. Nonetheless, 
some shortcomings still persist in this measure. For example, for mean values close to zero, the 
coefficient of variation will approach infinity and be sensitive to small changes in the mean. All 
12
basic results remain identical in (6). Real and monetary instability have the same qualitative impact, 
but, here, the coefficient of real volatility indicates that a 0.01 of standard deviation increase in (log) 
GDP per capita leads to a 0.05% point decrease in Business R&D. While an increase of two 
standard deviations in the real interest rate generates a 0.006% point decrease. 
In column (7), I verify the robustness of the institutional instability indicator by adding a measure of 
political constraints and an interaction between state fragility and political constraints. Henisz 
(2002) has constructed and used the ‘Political Constraint’ variable to show that constraints on the 
ease of policy shifts, in any given country, are conducive to infrastructural investment, and 
specifically to innovative investment. The index takes up values between 0 and 1, with higher 
values indicating more stringent political constraints. The idea is that, when any political actor can 
easily influence policy change, the resulting institutional framework will be more unstable. The 
political constraint measure is included in the model together with StateFragility and an interaction 
between the two. The impact of state fragility remains negative, however, its magnitude increases. 
Unlike in Henisz (2002), higher political constraints appear to hinder private R&D spending. This 
seemingly contradictory result can be reconciled if one considers that a slow pace of policy change 
is negatively correlated to innovation when it proxies for a conservative societal structure, or a 
malfunctioning National System of Innovation, as argued by Lundvall (1992). On the other hand, 
however, the interaction term between institutional instability and the political constraints index has 
a positive sign. This indicates that, given a negative impact of state fragility on business innovation, 
increased political constraints mitigate such negative impact, by limiting the extent to which 
instability can produce abrupt policy shifts. 
    Column (8) and (9) carry out some further robustness checks, via the inclusion of additional 
control variables. As pointed out by Serven (2003), fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate can 
13
affect the export/import incentives of firms. In (8), this international dimension is brought into the 
picture by adding the exchange rate level among the explanatory variables. At the same time, the 
coefficient of variation of the official exchange rate is also included to control for the effect of 
recurrent fluctuations in its level. Two additional terms are also constructed by interacting a dummy 
variable (EMU), with both the exchange rate level and its volatility. EMU takes the value of 1 for 
the countries which joined the European Monetary Union (EMU), but only in the year they 
switched currency regime. When the exchange rate is interacted with EMU, the interaction term 
controls for the structural break taking place when the euro currency regime is adopted, by 
correcting for the switch in measurement units.11 Instead, the interaction term between the volatility 
of the exchange rate and EMU is used to capture the increased exchange rate stability which 
followed the adoption of the common currency by the Euro Zone economies. While all previous 
results remain identical, none of the four variables enters the regression significantly. This result 
contradicts Serven (2003), but it is not an uncommon finding in the literature, as argued in Wang 
and Barrett (2007). 
    Moving to column (9), a number of additional regressors is included. Democracy takes values 
from 10 (democracies) to 0 (autocratic regimes). HighTechExports refers to the GDP share of high-
tech exports and it has been instrumented with its first and second lag to account for its likely 
endogeneity. TaxRevenue refers to the level of overall fiscal imposition to GDP. None of these 
variables enters the regression significantly. Though neither the significance nor the qualitative 
impact of all other variables is altered, both the F-stat and the Hansen-J statistic deteriorate sharply. 
In the last robustness test of column (10), I restrict the estimation sample to OECD countries only. 
This is done, first of all, because instability levels can be expected to be lower in these countries 
during the time span considered. At the same time, firms in high-income countries are likely to 
exhibit lower financial constraints and to have access to better developed financial markets. The 
14
combination of all such factors may result in firms’ improved ability to cope with volatility. Thanks 
to the availability of a longer time series, the reduced panel covers fewer countries (17) but 28 years 
(1981-2008). 
    The results shown in column (10) lend some support to our hypothesis, in that the impact of real, 
monetary, political, and financial instability is inconclusive.12 On the other hand, both the level of 
aggregate GDP per capita and the level of financial development are positive predictors of private 
R&D spending.13 In addition, trade openness also appears to have a positive impact on Business 
R&D in this sample (significant at the 10% level). This result is in line with the theoretical (Porter, 
1990; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) and empirical findings (Smolny, 2003; Sameti et al., 2010; 
Wang, 2010) of a number of studies showing that international openness is likely to positively 
impact technological progress, due to increased external exposure and interaction. Finally, an 
interesting finding of this specification is the negative relationship linking Business R&D to the 
index of property rights protection. However, this result should not be seen as surprising, given that 
the protection standards of physical and intellectual property rights enforced in OECD economies is 
already very high. Thus the result may indicate that there exists a certain threshold, after which 
stricter enforcement levels can prove detrimental to innovation incentives and diffusion (Bessen and 
Maskin, 2009).
5. Conclusions
This paper has studied the impact of macro-institutional instability on private innovative 
investment. The underlying motivation for investigating such relationship lies in the consideration 
that innovation is crucial to growth and development. Yet, its long maturity horizon coupled with its 
high-budget nature make it an intrinsically riskier type of investment. The empirical analysis has 
therefore sought to clarify the relationship between various dimensions of volatility and aggregate 
15
private R&D spending in unstable macro-institutional environments. The findings presented above 
suggest three channels through which macro-institutional volatility negatively affects business R&D 
investment, that is, political, real and monetary volatility. Such impact has been shown to exhibit 
non-linearities and to be larger for higher values of the real and monetary volatility dimensions. In 
addition, the negative effect of monetary instability appears to be mitigated during expansionary 
phases, in the sample considered. Lastly, the evidence on financial and international volatility is 
inconclusive. An important limitation to bear in mind when interpreting the above results is that the 
study inevitably overlooks all forms of incremental, small-scale, grassroots or non-industrial 
innovation, for which aggregate secondary data does not exist.The indirect policy implication 
deriving from such findings points towards the desirability of safeguarding stable macroeconomic 
and institutional environments if encouraging private innovation engagement is a priority. 
Considerations regarding the most appropriate policy tools are beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, an interesting avenue for further research seems to be the investigation of the role that 
targeted counter-cyclical policy interventions and firm subsidisation may play in preserving private 
profitability horizons and incentives.
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Notes
1. A vector of time-varying common effects is also included in the benchmark (column 11, 
Table 1), though, because never significant, it is dropped from all subsequent estimations.
2. The relevance of human capital availability for the innovation process has been highlighted 
by both theory (Lucas, 1988; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) and empirics (Wang, 2010). The reason 
why such variable is excluded from this analysis is because of its very high correlation with GDP.
3. Technical details on the construction of the volatility indicators can be found in Appendix B. 
4. The World Bank Atlas Classification System defines as lower middle income countries all 
countries with an average GNI per capita between the annual value of $1026-4035.
5. Note that, due to the structure of the dataset, using the second rather than the first lag to 
instrument the endogenous variable results in a higher number of observations. This is due to the 
fact that some countries only provide innovation spending data, every two years.
6. In calculating such impacts, the standardisation is done by considering a change of half of 
the observed standard deviation, reported in Table 2 (i.e. 0.1 for the coefficient of variation of (log) 
GDP per capita, around 0.5 for the standard deviation of the interest rate, 2 for State Fragility).
7.  Tax Revenue will also appear on its own in a subsequent specification.
8. The time dummies coefficients are not reported in the table for reasons of space.
9. A quadratic term of StateFragility is not included due to the ordinal nature of this variable.
10. The mean of (log) GDP per capita is calculated across the entire 1994-2008 time window. 
For each country, this is then subtracted from each year’s realised (log) GDP per capita value.
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11. Most EMU countries in my sample joined the currency union in 1999; the rest between 2001 
and 2007. When the switch takes place, LCU denominated exchange rates turn to euro 
denominations. The EMU dummy takes into account the break to avoid biasing the estimation.
12. Note that StateFragility could not be used in this sample due to its time coverage (earliest 
data period is 1994). Therefore Henisz’s Political Constraint Index is used instead.
13. Note that, in this sample, due to the data availability restrictions for the 1980s, stock market 
capitalisation has been substituted by a measure of private credit by commercial banks as a proxy 
for financial development.
Appendix A: Data and Country Appendix
Table A1. Data Sources
BusinessR&D R&D spending by the private sector (%GDP)
OECD-MSTI Database 
UNESCO - Stats.uis 
RICYT.org
GovernmentR&D  R&D spending by the public sector (%GDP)
 
OECD-MSTI Database 
UNESCO - Stats.uis
RICYT.org
LogGDPpercapita Log(Total Output / Population) World Bank-WDI 
InterestRate
Real interest rate based on lending rate charged to 
businesses by commercial banks (3 months-1 
year)
Own calculation. Raw data from 
World Bank-WDI
Balance Overall Deficit/Surlpus (%GDP) IMF -Government Finance Statistics
PropertyRights 0-10 Index where 10 indicates the highest level of 
rule of  law enforcement 
Economic Freedom of the  World 
– Area 2: Legal System and 
Property Rights
TradeOpenness (Exports + Imports) / GDP World Bank-WDI 
StockMarket
Value of listed shares to GDP, calculated using 
the deflation:{(0.5)*[Ft/Pet+Ft-1/Pet-1]}/(GDPt/Pat), 
where F is stock market capitalization, Pe is end-
of period CPI, and Pa is average annual CPI
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure (Beck 
et al. 2000)
StateFragility The Index scores countries on effectiveness and POLITY IV Dataset 
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legitimacy in four dimensions: security, political, 
economic, and social. Scores are 0-25 where 0 
indicates very stable countries
PoliticalConstraints
The index measures the feasibility of policy 
change It ranges from 0-1, with higher scores 
indicating more political constraint
Henisz’ Political Constraints 
Index III Dataset
ExchangeRate Nominal Exchange Rate (LCU per US$) World Bank-WDI IMF–International Financial 
Statistics
Democracy
The index ranges from -10 to 10, where -10 
is the score given to authoritarian regimes POLITY IV Dataset 
HighTechExports High-Tech Exports/ Tot Manufacturing Exp World Bank-WDI 
TaxRevenue Tot Tax Revenue / GDP IMF- Governance Finance Statistics 
FinancialDeveleopment
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP, calculated using the 
deflation:{(0.5)*[Ft/Pet+Ft-1/Pet-1]}/(GDPt/Pat) 
where F is stock market capitalization, Pe is end-
of period CPI, and Pa is average annual CPI
Database on Financial 
Development and Structure (Beck 
et al. 2000)
InfantMortality Infant Mortality Rate per 1000 live births World Bank - WDI 
LifeExpectancy Adjusted Life Expectancy at birth World Bank - WDI
Table A2. Country List
Argentina Cyprus* Ireland*† Mongolia Slovak Rep*
Australia† Czech Rep* Israel*† Netherlands*† Slovenia*
Austria*† Denmark*† Italy*† Norway† South Africa
Belgium*† Estonia* Japan† Panama Spain**
Bolivia Finland *† Korea Rep*† Paraguay Thailand
Brazil France** Kuwait Philippines Uganda
Bulgaria Germany*† Latvia* Poland* Ukraine
Canada*† Hungary* Lithuania Portugal*† United Kingdom*†
Chile Iceland*† Malaysia Romania United States*†
China India Malta* Russia Uruguay
Colombia Iran Mexico Singapore* Venezuela
*High-Income countries (ATLAS classification) *†OECD countries included in the 
robustness analysis †OECD countries appearing in the robustness analysis only.
Appendix B: Technical Appendix
B1. First Stage results
Table b1. Summary of Results for 1st Stage Regressions
F-test of excluded Ivs Angrist-Pischke Weak 
Identification test
Underidentification
test
LogGDPpercapita 63.53*** 24.15 59.68***
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LogGDPpercapita*
HighIncome
49.17*** 31.13 76.92***
GovernmentR&D 4.65*** 4.12 10.19***
TradeOpenness 14.45*** 5.47 13.52***
Obs. 341 341 341
Stock-Yogo weak 
identification 
crit. value (5%)
18.37
Notes: first-stage test statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust
B2. Notes on the Construction of the Volatility Measures
The Coefficient of Variation is a normalized measure of dispersion of a variable’s distribution over 
a certain time period. It is calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of a series.
 (A1)               v = ( σ µ )
where the standard deviation is calculated as follows
                                               (A2)                   σ = 1N - 1∑
N
i = 1(xi - x)
2
 In this paper, a two year rolling window is utilised to calculate both the mean and the standard 
deviation of (log) GDP per capita, real interest rate and stock market capitalisation. Thus real, 
monetary and financial volatility, in this context, is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to 
the mean of the rolling window. A backward looking strategy has been used in constructing such 
window, to reflect the type of knowledge agents might have of volatility at time t. Note that, 
because of the log transformation with which GDP per capita appears in the regressions, the 
coefficient magnitude of real volatility is not comparable to that of the other volatility measures. To 
restore visual comparability, the coefficient of variation of GDP per capita has been multiplied by 
100. Its quantitative interpretation will however also be in percentage change terms.
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Figure 1. Business R&D (%GDP)
The values represent the ratio of Business Funded R&D to GDP, and they are calculated as a national average over the time span 1994-
2008 (Raw data is from the OECD, Main Science&Technology Database, UNESCO UIS and RICYT
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Table 1. Benchmark Results
FE 2SLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LogGDPpercapita -0.262*** -0.261*** -0.231** -0.175* -0.321** -0.246* -0.224 -0.232** -0.423*** -0.226*
(0.088) (0.089) (0.092) (0.098) (0.139) (0.135) (0.138) (0.111) (0.144) (0.126)
LogGDPpercapita*
HighIncome
0.635*** 0.623*** 0.547*** 0.619*** 0.671*** 0.49*** 0.579*** 0.56*** 0.616*** 0.532***
(0.165) (0.166) (0.142) (0.193) (0.19) (0.162) (0.206) (0.098) (0.119) (0.113)
InterestRate -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
StockMarket 0.151*** 0.154*** 0.152*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 0.144*** 0.12** 0.118*** 0.113*** 0.088***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.053) (0.034) (0.038) (0.029)
Balance 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.006* 0.004 0.005* 0.010*** 0.005*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
PropertyRights 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.017 0.013 0.007 0.019**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
GovernmentR&D 0.215 0.213 0.261 0.204 0.179 0.169 0.103 0.283 0.466* 0.159
(0.189) (0.190) (0.181) (0.222) (0.21) (0.188) (0.124) (0.175) (0.246) (0.180)
TradeOpenness 0.057 0.059 0.086 0.018 0.029 0.092 0.035 0.059 0.143 0.030
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.077) (0.096) (0.166) (0.098)
StockMarketCoV -0.080* -0.040 -0.037 -0.011 -0.011 -0.026
(0.048) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.050) (0.046)
LogGDPpercapCoV -0.133** -0.205*** -0.111** -0.14*** -0.226*** -0.142***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.05) (0.037) (0.055) (0.040)
InterestRateCoV -0.005** -0.009*** -0.009** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
StateFragility -0.020* -0.022* -0.016 -0.017* -0.028** -0.023**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Obs. 398 396 393 343 340 338 294 295 305 284
R2 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.41 0.4 0.38
N. country
Wald F
Hansen-J
59
.
.
59
.
.
59
.
.
58
.
.
57
.
.
57
.
.
52
.
.
46
2.8
.
50
3
.
44
10
0.13
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in brackets. Significance level: p<0.1***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1. Columns 
(1)-(7) report within-estimator results. In (7), all endogenous regressors are lagged. Columns (8)-(10) report the 2SLS-FE results. 
In (8) and (9), respectively, only the first lag and second lag, in (10), first and second lags are combined. The results in (10) 
appear in bold to indicate this is the benchmark specification.
25
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
BusinessR&D 0.709 0.714 0.0007 3.402
GovernmentR&D 0.465 0.238 0.02 1.054
LogGDPpercapita 9.016 1.109 5.645 10.55
LogGDPpercapita*
HighIncome
9.562 0.662 7.973 10.55
InterestRate 6.082 6.433 0 43.8
StockMarket 0.624 0.58 0.006 3.084
PropertyRights 6.79 1.565 1.599 10
Balance -1.34 3.101 -12.67 11.37
TradeOpenness 0.97 0.626 0.234 4.381
StateFragility 3.214 4.058 0 16
LogGDPpercapCoV 0.324 0.241 0.009 1.271
InterestRateCoV 0.531 1.148 0.0005 11.74
StockMarketCoV 0.14 0.12 0.0007 0.813
ExchangeRate 189.7 746.3 0.298 9170
ExchangeRateCoV 0.082 0.186 0 1.38
LogGDPpercap_StDev
InterestRate_StDev
PoliticalConstraints
0.029
2.689
0.447
0.019
4.014
0.142
0.0009
0.374
0
0.094
41.84
0.718
Democracy
HighTechExports
TaxRevenue
FinancialDevelopment
FinancialDevelopmentCoV
8.641
16.61
18.07
0.929
0.345
3.116
14.7
6.033
0.381
0.386
-7
0.513
0.957
0.229
0
10
73.59
33.19
2.024
0.266
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Table 3. Robustness Checks
                                                           2SLS-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LogGDPpercapita -0.226* -0.983*** -0.359** -0.42*** -0.243 -0.407*** -0.24** -0.247** -0.354** 0.635***
(0.126) (0.332) (0.179) (0.148) (0.290) (0.127) (0.111) (0.119) (0.152) (0.245)
LogGDPpercapita*
HighIncome
0.532*** 0.822*** 0.61*** 0.659*** 0.54*** 0.678*** 0.428*** 0.529*** 0.604***
(0.113) (0.238) (0.134) (0.133) (0.152) (0.108) (0.108) (0.112) (0.172)
InterestRate -0.004*** -0.002* -0.004*** -0.004** -0.003** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003* 0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009)
StockMarket 0.088*** 0.101** 0.09*** 0.098*** 0.092** 0.1*** 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.075**
(0.029) (0.043) (0.033) (0.031) (0.037) (0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Balance 0.005* 0.011** 0.009*** 0.006* 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.01
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
PropertyRights 0.019** 0.011 0.019** 0.023** 0.02** 0.012* 0.019* 0.018** 0.021* -0.028*
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.01) (0.007) (0.01) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016)
GovernmentR&D 0.159 0.271 0.121 0.143 0.162 0.218 -0.08 0.099 0.223 0.205
(0.180) (0.793) (0.155) (0.178) (0.178) (0.160) (0.141) (0.167) (0.204) (0.216)
TradeOpenness 0.030 0.928** 0.002 0.048 0.033 0.031 0.053 0.059 0.204 0.543*
(0.098) (0.4) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.104) (0.087) (0.096) (0.129) (0.286)
StockMarketCoV -0.026 -0.017 -0.057
(0.046) (0.065) (0.049)
LogGDPpercapCoV -0.142*** -0.289*** -0.125*** -0.28*** -0.121*** -0.126*** -0.139*** -0.157*** 0.091
(0.040) (0.08) (0.04) (0.108) (0.043) (0.036) (0.044) (0.046) 0.11
InterestRateCoV -0.01*** -0.015*** -0.009*** -0.118** -0.01** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.143
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.052) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.103)
StateFragility -0.023** -0.048** -0.026** -0.032*** -0.025** -0.02** -0.056*** -0.025*** -0.023**
(0.009) (0.016) (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011)
LogGDPpercapitaCoV_sq 0.173*
(0.100)
InterestRateCoV_sq 0.077*
(0.042)
LogGDPpercapitaCoV_nonlin -0.157
(0.313)
InterestRateCoV_nonlin 0.001**
(0.00)
StateFragility_nonlin -0.00
(0.001)
LogGDPpercap_StDev -1.057**
(0.429)
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InterestRate_StDev -0.003**
(0.001)
PoliticalConstraints -0.434*** 1.75
(0.121) (1.09)
StateFragility
*PoliticalConstraints
0.061***
(0.019)
ExchangeRate -0.00
(0.00)
ExchangeRateEMU -0.039
(0.025)
ExchangeRateCoV -0.029
(0.085)
ExchangeRateCovEMU 0.042
(0.092)
Democracy -0.003
(0.013)
HighTechExports -0.002
(0.004)
TaxRevenue 0.009
(0.006)
FinancialDevelopment 0.145*
(0.083)
FinancialDevelopmentCoV 0.132
(0.348)
Obs. 284 341 284 259 278 252 275 284 268 248
R2 0.38 0.15 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.4 0.22
N. country
Wald-F
Hansen-J
44
10
0.13
47
1.4
0.08
44
11
0.49
44
10.5
0.35
44
8.6
0.42
44
8.6
0.16
44
10
0.24
44
8.3
0.17
44
4
       0.09
16
59.3
0.12
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1. Column (1) corresponds 
to the benchmark model in column (10) of Table 2. In (2), external instruments are used. In (3), time dummies are added. In (4) 
and (5), non-linearities are modelled. In (6), new political instability measures are included. In (7), the coefficient of variation is 
substituted by the standard deviation. In (8), the exchange rate and its volatility are added. In (9), three additional regressors are 
included. In column (10), the benchmark specification in (1) is estimated in an OECD country panel.
